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DISPUTES AFTER RODRIGUEZ AND
THE IMPACT ON INVESTOR
PROTECTION
JANET
I.

E. KERR

INTRODUCTION

In Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express,' the United

States Supreme Court struck a final blow to Wilko v. Swan,2 a decision
rendered thirty-five years ago. Wilko held that predispute arbitration agreements between brokers and their clients were unenforceable when an inves-

tor brought a claim under subsection 12(2) 3 of the Securities Act of 1933
[hereinafter "Securities Act"].4 Wilko ruled that the resolution of such a
claim in a judicial forum could not be waived.5 In reversing Wilko, the
1. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
2. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
3. Subsection 12(2) provides:
Any person who...
(2) offers or sells a security... by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be
liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction ....
15 U.S.C. § 77(I) (1988).
4. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
5. Id. at 435.
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Rodriguez Court has literally opened up the flood gates for the arbitration
of federal securities laws claims.6
This article analyzes the reasons for the change in the Court's position
and attempts to focus on the problems and inconsistencies created by the
Rodriguez decision, as well as the issues left unaddressed by the case. In
doing so, it is necessary to discuss the clash between the underlying policies
of the federal securities laws and those of the Federal Arbitration Act7 and
to examine the Supreme Court cases preceding Rodriguez which have dealt
with this conflict.'
II.

THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND THE FEDERAL

ARBITRATION ACT -

THE PURPOSES OF EACH AND THE

RESULTING CONFLICT

The Stock Market Crash of 1929 led to the passage of the Securities
Act 9 as well as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter "Exchange
Act"]. 10 Both were passed to protect investors from the same kind of
problems that caused the Crash, namely fraud and the lack of information
surrounding securities transactions.1
6. The number of securities disputes over the past six years has grown steadily. It appears
that this trend can be attributed to the Supreme Court's decision in Shearson/American Express
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), which prohibited the waiver of arbitration clauses in actions
commenced under subsection 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. It is anticipated
that Rodriguez will do the same. For example, through August 1988, the New York Stock Exchange [hereinafter "NYSE"] caseload increased 91% over the comparable 1987 period. The
caseload has increased "geometrically" and has been felt by all Self-regulating Organizations
[hereinafter "SROs"]. See Morris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon: An SRO Perspective,
PLI CONFERENCE REPORT 759, 762, 769 (Sept. 12, 1988).
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988) (formerly the United States Arbitration Act).
8. For a further discussion of post Wilko, pre-Rodriguez case history, see Brown, Shell &
Tyson, Arbitration of Customer-Broker Disputes Arising Under the FederalSecurities Laws and
RICO, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1987); Fletcher, PrivatizingSecurities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393 (1987); Malcolm & Segal, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be
Extended?, 50 ALB. L. REv. 725 (1986); Comment, PredisputeArbitration Agreements Between
Brokers and Investors: The Extension of Wilko to Section 10(b) Claims, 46 MD. L. REv. 339
(1987); Note, Arbitrability of Implied Rights of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 506 (1986).
9. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1988)).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988)).
11. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979). In Naftalin, the Supreme Court
stated that Congress' primary intent in passing the Securities Act was to prevent fraud against
investors and to heal the economy. Id. The Exchange Act was also passed to further these objectives. See Note, Mixed Arbitrableand NonarbitrableClaims in SecuritiesLitigation: Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 525, 533 n.52 (1985). It was thought that the une-
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The Securities Act was passed to prevent fraud and the lack of information in the initial offer or sale of securities.1 2 It was also enacted to provide
investors with express rights of action as delineated in subsection 12(2). ' 3
The Exchange Act was passed with these same purposes in mind; however,
the Exchange Act regulates the trading of securities in the secondary market, the exchanges and over-the-counter markets. Additionally, it serves to
prevent fraud and manipulation in these markets. 14 Unlike the Securities
Act, the Exchange Act has no similar express private cause of action similar
to subsection 12(2).15 Rather, it contains subsection 10(b), 1 6 a general
qual bargaining position between industry personnel and investors was responsible for the fraud
underlying pre-crash securities transactions. Thus, steps were required to put these parties on
more equal footing.
12. Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 775-76.
13. Section 12(2) is one of the provisions of the Securities Act that offers a purchaser an
express cause of action against persons who have made false or misleading statements or omissions in connection with the offer or sale of a security. See supra note 3. Section 12(2) attempts to
equalize the unequal bargaining power that exists between securities industry personnel and their
customers by requiring full disclosure of material information to buyers of securities. See Malcolm & Segall, supra note 8, at 730-31.
14. See Note, supra note 11, at 531-34.
15. See Malcolm & Segall, supra note 8, at 732.
16. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ....
(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 780) (1988).
Pursuant to this authority, the Securities Exchange Commission [hereinafter "SEC"] promulgated Rule 10(b)-5, which provideg:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange(a) [T]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) [T]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) "o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1989).
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antifraud provision, 17 which is a judicially implied private cause of action."8
Both federal securities laws also provide specifically for the manner in
which disputes are to be decided. They each require a judicial forum. The
Securities Act empowers federal and state courts with concurrent jurisdiction.1 9 The Exchange Act, on the other hand, empowers the federal courts
with exclusive jurisdiction."z
The Federal Arbitration Act [hereinafter "Arbitration Act"] was passed
in 1925, 2 ' prior to the passage of both securities acts, and established a
"federal policy favoring arbitration."2 2 The Arbitration Act was passed to
promote the use of arbitration as an alternative to litigation as well as to
overcome judicial hostility toward arbitration. 3 It was felt that an efficient
17. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (referring to subsection 10(b) as a
"'catchall' clause").
18. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (stating that a private
cause of action, under both subsection 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5, has been consistently recognized and that "[t]he existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond
peradventure").
19. Subsection 22(a) of the Securities Act creates concurrent federal state jurisdiction of all
Securities Act claims. It provides:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory, shall
have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this subchapter and under the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State
and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this subchapter. Any such suit or action may be brought in the
district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, or in the
district where the offer or sale took place, if the defendant participated therein, and process
in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
wherever the defendant may be found.... No case arising under this subchapter and
brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the
United States.

15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988).
20. Section 27 of the Exchange Act creates exclusive federal jurisdiction and provides:
"The district courts of the United States... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
21. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
22. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). The Court
stated:
The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or
a like defense to arbitrability.
Id. at 24-25. See also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)
(citing Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24).
23. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32, 432 n.12 (1953) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924) [hereinafter Senate
Report]; see also Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the FederalArbitration Act, 71 IowA L.

1989]

IMPACT ON INVESTOR PROTECTION

and relatively low-cost process of adjudicating business disputes was
needed.24 The Arbitration Act provides that arbitration agreements shall
be enforced to the same degree as other contractual agreements. 25 Addi-

tionally, there is a presumption in favor of arbitrating disputes unless an
exception or defense can be found under the Arbitration Act26 or the Act is
overridden by contrary congressional intent.2 7

Once a judicial action is commenced between parties to an arbitration
agreement, the Arbitration Act requires both federal and state courts to

stay judicial proceedings in favor of arbitration upon request of either

party.2 8 The Arbitration Act also provides that if one party wishes to in-

voke a predispute arbitration provision before filing a complaint, but the
opposing party refuses to comply, the first party may unilaterally petition a
United States district court for an order compelling arbitration.2 9
III. THE MANY FACES OF WILKO V SWAN

-

WILKO AND ITS

INTERPRETATIONS

From the moment the Court rendered its decision in Wilko v. Swan,
confusion and contradicting interpretations of the case followed. Most of
the uncertainty was provided by the Court itself in its post-Wilko decisions.
In order to reach an understanding of the Court's recent holding in Rodri-

REv. 1137, 1139-42 (1986) (a historical analysis of the Arbitration Act); Note, The Arbitrabilityof
FederalSecurities Claims: Wilko's Swan Song, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 206 (1987).
24. See, eg., Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-32.
25. The Arbitration Act states that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See also Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-43.
26. The most common defenses are fraud or overreaching. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
27. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226. The Court stated that the burden was on the party opposing
arbitration to prove congressional intent "deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history
... or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes." Id. at
227 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
28. Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act [hereinafter "FAA"] provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had ....
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
29. Section 4 of the FAA provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:217

guez, it is first necessary to explore the history of Wilko and its multi-fold
interpretations.
A.

The Wilko Case

Decided in 1953, Wilko v. Swan was the first case to recognize the potential clash between the Arbitration Act and the federal securities laws.
The case arose from a lawsuit brought by a customer against the investment
firm of Hayden, Stone and Company [hereinafter "Hayden, Stone"]. 30 The
investor alleged he was fraudulently induced to purchase a certain number
of shares of common stock of Air Associates.3 1
The investor brought suit pursuant to subsection 12(2) of the Securities
Act.32 Prior to the claim, the investor entered into a predispute arbitration
agreement with his broker at Hayden, Stone in connection with a margin
account agreement. The investor sought enforcement of his subsection
12(2) claim in a judicial forum, federal court. In response, Hayden, Stone
moved to stay the judicial proceedings, arguing that the arbitration agreement should be enforced. 3 The Supreme Court held that the Securities Act
precluded enforcement of predispute agreements upon two grounds: the
literal wording of the Securities Act; and the pro-investor policies underlying the Act. 4
1. The Holding in Wilko
In order to construe the literal wording of the Securities Act, the Court
focused on subsections 12(2), Section 14 and subsection 22(a) of the Act.35
Specifically, the Court stated that the issue was whether Section 14 of the
Act precluded enforcement of the arbitration agreement.36 Section 14 voids

30. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 428, 488 (1953). The SEC participated as amicus curiae on
behalf of the petitioner. Id.

31. Id. at 428-29. Specifically, the investor stated that the broker had induced him to buy
shares based on false representation of an upcoming merger. Based on these misrepresentations,
the investor was led to believe that the value of the Air stock would increase. Thereafter, the
stock value declined.

32. See supra note 3 for the text of subsection 12(2).
33. The district court ruled that the agreement to arbitrate deprived the petitioner of the

favorable judicial remedy afforded by the Securities Act and denied the stay. Wilko, 346 U.S. at
430. The court of appeals reversed the district court and concluded that the Act did not prohibit
the agreement from referring future controversies to arbitration. Id.
34. Id. at 433-38.
35. Id. at 430-31.
36. Id. at 430.
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"any condition, stipulation or provision... [that] waive[s] compliance with
any provision.. ." of the Securities Act.37
The Court considered the arbitration agreement to be a "stipulation" 38
under Section 14 and proceeded to the major focus of the issue - whether
subsection 22(a) was the type of "provision" to which Section 14 applied.3 9
To ascertain whether subsection 22(a) was the type of "provision" to which
Section 14 pertained, the Court relied on the nature of subsection 12(2), the
underlying cause of action in the case. 4' It stated that subsection 12(2) created a "special right" for investors; a right or cause of action substantially
different from the common law action. 41 The Court explained that subsection 12(2) differed from common law because the burden on the issue of
scienter is shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant.42 The Court further
stated that this special right effectuates the underlying policy of the Securities Act; to protect investors by "requir[ing] issuers, underwriters and deal43
ers to make full and fair disclosure" in connection with their sale.
The Court concluded that the only way the special right could be effectuated or maintained was through the procedural guarantees of subsection
22(a). 4 The Court enumerated the specific procedural benefits of this subsection and stated that these benefits were not present in an arbitral
forum. 45

2.

Policy Considerations and the Underlying Purpose
of the Securities Act

Besides construing Section 14 literally, as preventing the waiver of the
subsection 22(a) judicial forum provision, the Court discussed the underlying policy considerations for construing the forum as judicial, rather than
arbitral. The Court reasoned that because the Securities Act is designed to
37. Id. Section 14 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules
and regulations of the Commission shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988).
38.

Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434.

39. Id. at 433-38.
40. Subsection 22(a) further provides for concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts

for all Securities Act claims. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988).
41. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
42. Id.; see supra note 3 for text of subsection 12(2).
43. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
44. Id. at 437.
45. Id. at 437-38. Among the benefits noted by the Court were: the choice of bringing an

action in a state or federal court, with the removal from state forum being forbidden; the wide
choice of venue and nationwide service of process if the federal court is selected; and the lack of
applicability of diversity and jurisdictional amount requirement. Id. The Court further noted

that these benefits were not present in an arbitral forum. Id.
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protect buyers against the numerous "disadvantages" they face when dealing with specialists in securities transactions, Section 14 should apply to
subsection 22(a). 41 It was argued that when an investor signs a predispute
arbitration agreement, he frequently is in a disadvantageous position and
surrenders rights under the Securities Act "at a time when he is less able to
judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his
adversary." '4 7
The Court also posited that the arbitration process does not adequately
protect buyers. 48 Among the deficiencies noted by the Court were the arbitrators' lack of judicial instruction on the law, the lack of written reasons
given for awards, the limited nature of judicial review and the power to
vacate.4 9
An arbitrator's lack of judicial instruction on the law was particularly
problematic." The Court stated that any misconceptions regarding the
"legal meaning of such statutory requirements as 'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact' " on the part of the arbitrator would go unexamined. 1 Under this policy argument, the Court held that the right to choose
a judicial forum was a "substantial right" and that any "agreement, restricting that choice, would thwart the express purpose of the statute."5 2
B.

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.

-

A New Interpretationof Wilko

Following the Wilko decision, most federal courts expanded Wilko to
include cases involving subsection 10(b) of the Exchange Act.5 3 In 1974,
the issue of this expansion was brought before the Supreme Court in Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co.5 4 The case involved an international securities transaction between Alberto-Culver, an American company, and a German individual who was the owner of three businesses. 5 The transaction involved a
46. Id. at 435.
47. Id. The Court stated that the investor in waiving his right to sue "gives up more than
would a participant in other business transactions" for the very reason that he has a "wider choice
of courts and venue." Id.
48. Id. at 435-37.
49. Id. at 436.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 438.
53. See supra note 16 for text.
54. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
55. Id. at 508-09. The transaction involved the sale of these businesses by the German owner
to Alberto-Culver along with the purchase of certain trademarks. An allegation of fraud arose in
connection with whether the trademarks were encumbered. Within one year of the closing of the
agreement, Alberto-Culver alleged that the trademarks "were suspect to substantial encumbrances that threatened" to preclude Culver from deriving any benefit from them. Id. at 509.
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number of international laws and a contract that included predispute arbitration agreements. The contract provided that arbitration of any dispute
would be decided before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris,
France, and that the laws of Illinois would govern the performance and
interpretation of the agreement. 6
Alberto-Culver sued under subsection 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule lOb-5 alleging fraudulent representation regarding the status of the
trademarks.5 7 While the Supreme Court held that Wilko was not applicable,5 8 it fell short of stating that Wilko should not be extended to subsection
10(b) claims in general. 9 The Court described the contract between the
parties as "a truly international agreement ' 6 and distinguished Wilko as
applying to domestic securities disputes rather than international ones.6 1
The Court also pointed out the unique problems and issues arising from
international business transactions.62 In general, these types of transactions
usually involve complex conflict of law problems for which an understanding of foreign law would be necessary.63 Additionally, the Court reasoned
that the advantages that Wilko gives to investors were "chimerical" in the
international context, because an opposing party, by resorting quickly to a4
foreign court, could deny a security buyer access to an American court.r
Thus, the arbitration clause was taken as a "specialized kind of forum-selection" that permitted an orderly choice of situs and procedures to resolve the
dispute.65 The Court's general concern was the hampering of international
trade if predispute arbitration agreements were not enforced. 66 Accordingly, the Court held that agreements to arbitrate future securities disputes
arising out of international transactions should be enforced.6'

56. Id. at 508. The enterprises were organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein.
The contract was negotiated in the United States, England and Germany and was signed in Austria and Switzerland, respectively. Id. at 506.
57. Id. at 509-10. Alberto-Culver ified suit against Scherk in an Illinois federal district court.
Scherk filed a motion to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris pursuant to the parties' contract. Alberto-Culver then sought a preliminary injunction to restrain Scherk from proceeding
with arbitration. The district court issued a preliminary order enjoining Scherk from seeking
arbitration. Id. The Seventh Circuit applied Wilko and affirmed. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk,
484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
58. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
59. Id. at 514 n.8.
60. Id. at 515.
61. Id. at 515-16.
62. Id. at 515.
63. Id. at 516 n.10.
64. Id. at 518.
65. Id. at 519.
66. Id. at 517-19.
67. Id. at 519-20.
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However, it was the dictum in Scherk that became even more important
than the holding.6 8 Justice Stewart raised "a colorable argument" that regardless of the nature of the dispute, Wilko should not be applied to subsection 10(b) claims.6 9 The "colorable argument" actually contained four
smaller arguments. Justice Stewart argued that Wilko should not apply because: (1) There was no statutory counterpart to subsection 12(2) in the
Exchange Act;7 ° (2) even though courts had recognized a subsection 10(b)
private right of action, the Exchange Act "does not provide the special right
that the Court in Wilko found significant;" 71 (3) neither subsection 10(b)
nor Rule lOb-5 "speaks of a private remedy to redress violations of the kind
alleged here;"7 2 and (4) the jurisdictional provision in the Exchange Act,
73
Section 22, was more restrictive than that in the Securities Act.
In the Scherk dissent, Justice Douglas stated that all of the problems
associated with arbitration of subsection 12(2) claims listed by Wilko also
exist for subsection 10(b) claims.74 Douglas posited that the "loss of the
proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substantial rights. ' 75 Therefore, just as a substantial right is lost when the investor is denied access to a
state or federal court under the Securities Act, he likewise suffers when the
exclusive federal forum provided by the Exchange Act is taken away.76
Federal appellate courts for the most part followed Scherk, rejecting
Justice Stewart's "colorable argument,"7 7 and extending Wilko to subsection 10(b) claims. 78 The Wilko holding was extended to subsection 10(b)
68. See also infra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
69. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 514.
72. Id. at 513.
73. Id. at 514.
74. Id. at 532. Justice Douglas reiterated the problems listed in Wilko in connection with the
inadequacies in the arbitral system such as " 'subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge' of
the defendant, questions ill-determined by arbitration without judicial instruction on the law;" no
development of a record; no judicial review; the unavailability of extensive pretrial discovery provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and lack of a wide choice of venue as provided by
Section 27. Id. (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
75. Id.
76. See Id. at 532 n. 11. Other lost rights flowing from the refusal to extend Wilko are: the
right to a federal forum without a need to meet diversity or jurisdictional amount requirements;
nationwide service of process provided by Section 27 of the Securites Act; and the venue provisions of Section 27, which in fact provide the plaintiff with a wider choice than the venue provisions of subsection 22(a) of the Securities Act. See Comment, supra note 8, at 350 n.107 (citing
Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 526-27 (9th Cir. 1986)).
77. For an excellent discussion of the "colorable argument" see Comment, supra note 8, at
347-66.
78. See, eg., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th
Cir. 1984); First Heritage Corp. v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 710 F.2d 1205, 1207 (6th Cir. 1983);
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for several reasons. First, it was recognized that the policy behind the Securities Act and the Exchange Act - that of investor protection - is the
same,7 9 and that both subsections 12(2) and 10(b) effectuate this policy."
Second, the statutory framework of the two acts were noted as having virtually the same non-waiver provisions."' Third, it was asserted that Congress

favored the extension of Wilko because it left Wilko untouched in its 1975
revisions of the federal securities laws82 and made an exception to the nonarbitrability of securities claims under the Exchange Act by creating a sec-

tion which allowed for the arbitration of disputes between securities person-

nel.83 Finally, the SEC traditionally disfavored arbitration84 and made

clear that its position pertained to the arbitration of disputes under both
acts.8 5
C. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd Revisited

The "ColorableArgument"

In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,"6 the plaintiff invested $160,000

in securities through Dean Witter. When the value of his account fell by
more than $100,000 he alleged violations of subsection 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The question before the Supreme Court was whether a motion
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978);
Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835-36 (7th Cir. 1977);
Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
79. See, eg., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 835.
80. Moore, 590 F.2d at 827.
81. See, eg., Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 836; Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536; cf.Sibley v. Tandy Corp.,
543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (adopting the rationale
that the similarities between the two acts far outweigh any differences).
82. Ayres, 538 F.2d 532. For a further discussion of the 1975 amendments, see infra notes
157-62 and accompanying text.
83. Section 28 of the Exchange Act was amended to permit compulsory arbitration of securities claims between most securities personnel. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1988).
84. The SEC had adopted Rule 15c2-2 which prohibited brokers from using predispute arbitration clauses in agreements with customers that purport to bind investors to arbitrate when
federal securities law claims are at issue. Rule 15c2-2 specifically provided:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker or dealer to
enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports to bind the customer to
the arbitration of future disputes between them arising under the Federal securities laws, or
to have in effect such an agreement, pursuant to which it effects transactions with or for a
customer.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986).
The SEC position on arbitration later changed and Rule 15c2-2 was rescinded. See infra note
198 and accompanying text.
85. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 (1983).
86. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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to compel arbitration of arbitrable state claims could be denied when the
plaintiff raised both federal securities claims and pendent state claims in
connection with a transaction involving a predispute arbitration
agreement."7
Prior to Byrd, the courts of appeals lacked uniformity in addressing this
issue. Some reasoned that arbitrable state claims were "intertwined" with
nonarbitrable federal claims and, therefore, the state claims should not be
sent to arbitration."8 As a result, the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts in federal securities matters would then be preserved. Other courts
of appeals ruled in favor of arbitrating both claims, basing their decision
either on the strong federal policy of the Arbitration Act or the refusal to
recognize the "intertwining" concept.8 9 The Supreme Court agreed with
the latter position and rejected the "intertwining" concept, holding that
even though "piecemeal" litigation would result, the Arbitration Act compelled arbitration of the state claims despite the presence of nonarbitrable
federal claims.90
The Court in Byrd carefully avoided the issue of Wilko's application to
subsection 10(b) claims, stating that it was not an issue;9 1 however, in a
concurring opinion, Justice White addressed this issue. 92 Additionally,
both the majority and concurring opinions provided insight into the Court's
position on the "colorable argument" made in Scherk.93 Even though it
chose not to resolve Wilko's applicability to subsection 10(b) claims, the
discussion of the "colorable argument" foreshadowed the impact of Justice
Stewart's dictum in Scherk on future cases.
In Byrd, the Court recognized that Scherk did not interpret Wilko as
being inapplicable to subsection 10(b) claims; 94 however, it noted that the
Scherk Court "questioned" the extension of Wilko to subsection 10(b)
claims. 95 The Court pointed out that many federal courts had applied
Wilko to subsection 10(b) claims. 96 Justice White, in his concurring opin-

87. Id. at 214.

88. See, e.g., Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470
U.S. 213 (1985); cf Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543 (holding that since the claims were not "'intertwined'
in a legal sense," the state claims should be submitted to arbitration).
89. Sunnan, 733 F.2d 59; Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinhold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
90. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 215-16 n.1.
Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring); see infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that Justice White dissented in Scherk.
Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215-16 n.1.

95. Id.

96. Id.
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ion, restated with some amplification the "colorable argument" raised in
Scherk's majority opinion9 7 and by doing so, gave new impetus to the argument, Justice White interpreted the basis of the Wilko decision to be the
interconnection between subsections 12(2) and 22(a), and Section 14 of the
Securities Act. 98 He further explained that the Court's reasoning in Wilko
could not be "mechanically transplanted to the 1934 Act." 99
Justice White recounted the components of the Scherk argument and
how they served to distinguish the two acts."°° Further, Justice White commented on the express versus the implied nature of subsections 12(2) and
10(b) respectively,10 1 and assigned particular importance to the fact that
subsection 10(b) provided only an implied cause of action."°2 He stated that
two conclusions could be drawn from this. First, "[t]he phrase 'waive compliance with any provision of this chapter,' [§ 29(a),] is... literally applicable." 103 Second, Wilko's "solicitude for the federal cause of action - the
'special right' established by Congress ... is not necessarily appropriate
where the cause of action is judicially implied and not so different from the
common law action.""lc 4 Therefore, the waiver provisions would not be applicable to an implied cause of action.
Justice White also noted that even though the non-waiver provisions of
the acts were equivalent, he did not consider this similarity important
enough to overcome the dissimilarities between subsections 12(2) and 22(a)
of the Securities Act and subsection 10(b) and Section 27 of the Exchange
Act.10 5 His comments on the issue attempted to address a point which Justice Stewart had not mentioned in his original argument, i.e., the similarities
between the two acts.
D. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
In MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,10 6 the Court did
not address the arbitrability of securities law claims but instead addressed
claims arising under the federal antitrust laws.10 7 The opinion, however,
97. Id. at 224 (White, J.,
concurring).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 224-25.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983)).
103. Id. at 225.
104. Id. (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 224.
106. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
107. The Mitsubishi case involved a sales agreement that contained a clause requiring disputes be brought before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. The Court held that an
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contained language directly applicable to Wilko and its possible extension
to subsection 10(b). 108
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun first recognized the" 'liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.' ,9 Justice Blackmun
stated that if arbitration is to be denied, then there must be clear Congressional intent from the text or legislative history "to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."' o These comments gave
a clear message that because subsection 10(b) was a judicially implied remedy and not an express cause of action created by Congress, the Court was
not in a position to extend Wilko when the issue came before it.
The Mitsubishi decision struck directly at Wilko's assumption concerning the inadequacies of the arbitration process. Mitsubishi appeared to lend
full support to the arbitration process in concluding:
[A]daptability and access ...are hallmarks of arbitration. The anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account
when the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts .... [T]he factor of potential
complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal
could not properly handle an antitrust matter."'
The dissent in Mitsubishi, authored by Justice Stevens, raised an unexpected argument: Federal statutory laws were an exception to the Arbitration Act" 2 in that there was "[n]othing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor its
legislative history, [that] suggests that Congress intended to authorize the
arbitration of any statutory claims."1 1 3 Justice Stevens declared that the
Court had previously distinguished statutory rights from contractual
rights." 4 In conclusion, the dissent argued that:
both a fair respect for the importance of the interests that Congress
has identified as worthy of federal statutory protection, and a fair
appraisal of the most likely understanding of the parties who sign
agreements containing standard arbitration clauses, support a presumption that such clauses do not apply to federal statutory
claims1 1
agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the antitrust laws in an international commercial setting was valid and binding.

Id. at 640.

108. Id. at 624-40.
109. Id. at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S.

1, 24 (1983)).
110. Id. at
111. Id. at
112. Id. at
113. Id. at
114. Id. at
115. Id. at

628.
633-34.
650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
646.
647.
650.

1989]

IMPACT ON INVESTOR PROTECTION

E. The Impact of Byrd and Mitsubishi on Wilko's Extension
After Byrd and Mitsubishi, any unanimity between the courts of appeals
on Wilko's extension to subsection 10(b) was unequivocally destroyed.1 16
The First and Eighth Circuits used Justice White's discussion of the "colorable argument" in his concurring opinion in Byrd as a reason for refusing to
apply Wilko to subsection 10(b).1 17 These circuits emphasized the dissimilarity between the two acts, in particular the dissimilarity between the express cause of action within subsection 12(2) and the judicially implied
cause of action of subsection 10(b). 118 They concluded that the nonwaiver
provisions in the Exchange Act did not apply to implied causes of action
because they were a judicial creation and, therefore, Congressional intent
to extend the judicial forum guarantees to these causes of action was absent. 19 These courts also reiterated the persistent federal policy favoring
arbitration and likewise emphasized the strong trend in Supreme Court de120
cisions toward arbitration.
In contrast, the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits extended Wilko to subsection 10(b) claims. These courts focused on the similarities between the Securities and Exchange Acts and argued that the
judicially implied cause of action of subsection 10(b) was just as important
and deserved the same kind of protection as the express causes of action in
subsection 12(2).
Additionally, the courts argued other justifications supported the extension to subsection 10(b), such as the binding precedent of Wilko and the

116. The failure of the federal courts to address only the similarities and not the specific
distinctions between subsections 12(2) and 10(b) as Stewart had originally pointed out in Scherk,
may have created this riff. The issues regarding whether subsections 12(2) and 10(b) are a "special
right" equivalent to subsection 12(2) and whether an implied remedy is inferior to an explicit
private remedy was not considered. Comment, supra note 8, at 349-50, 362-64.
117. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 297 (1st Cir.
1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 795 F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987).
118. See, eg., Page, 806 F.2d at 297. The court stated:
[T]o distinguish Wilko, we rely on the failure of Congress to provide for an express right of
action in the 1934 Act. Had Congress regarded an exclusive federal court forum as so
critical, it would have been simple for Congress to provide, as it did in the 1933 Act, that
individuals be able to bring a cause of action in that forum.
Id.
119. See, eg., id. at 297-98.
120. The Pagecourt used this reason more so than the "colorable argument" as a basis for its
decision. Id. The court in Phillips adopted the colorable argument in its entirety and mentioned
only briefly the policy favoring arbitration. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1395, 1398.
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public policy concerns of the federal securities
laws in protecting investors
12 1
from their unequal bargaining position.
F.

Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon

1. The McMahon Holding
The Court finally addressed the issue of Wilko's application to claims
arising from subsection 10(b) disputes in Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon. 2 2 The case involved the McMahons, two clients of Shearson/American Express, who jointly held several profit-sharing and pension
accounts with the brokerage firm. The McMahons alleged that the registered representative who handled their accounts violated subsection 10(b),
with Shearson's knowledge, by making false representations and omissions
when advising the McMahons about their accounts. Further, they alleged
several violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organization Acts [hereinafter "RICO"].' 23 The service agreement between the
McMahons and their broker contained a predispute arbitration clause.
Even though the MeMahons had signed this agreement, they argued that its

121. Malcolm & Segall, supra note 8, at 747 n.145 (citing Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800
F.2d 1032, 1038 (11th Cir. 1986) (en bane)). The Wolfe court stated that Sibley v. Tandy Corp.,
543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977), "was the law in the former Fifth
Circuit since 1976 and in this circuit since its formation. Sibley cited Scherk [v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)] and declined to adopt its 'colorable argument.' Byrd again, added
nothing new." Wolfe, 800 F.2d at 1038. See also King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796
F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1986) (reasoning that because "[tlhe Supreme Court, in its most recent
examination of the relevant arbitration principles, expressly declined to pass on the merits of our
Circuit's rule," it must follow earlier precedent in the Fifth Circuit); Conover v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that, "to the extent that Wilko rests
upon the conclusion that an arbitration agreement is an impermissible waiver of enforcement
rights arising pursuant to statute or regulations," it should apply to claims pursuant to subsection
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 since the waiver provisions of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act are so similar); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d at 94,
96 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "[a]Ithough Scherk [v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)]
and Byrd may cast some doubt on whether the Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, would
hold claims under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 to be non-arbitrable, it would be improvident for us to
disregard clear judicial precedent in this Circuit based on mere speculation"); Jacobson v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that "[i]n Byrd
the Court ... expressly declined to resolve the applicability of Wilko to section 10(b) claims" and
thus Byrd "cannot fairly be read as casting any doubt upon the continued authority of" Ayres v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 598 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
1010 (1977).
122. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
123. Id. at 223-24. Additionally, the representative was accused of churning the McMahon's
accounts.
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enforcement should be struck down because it was an adhesion contract
and Wilko was applicable.12 a
Although the McMahon Court held that Wilko did not extend to subsection 10(b) or to RICO claims, 2 5 it did not overrule Wilko. It held that
Wilko was decided correctly and did apply to Securities Act claims, but
added that the Wilko Court may have erred in its statutory interpretation of
Section 14.126
2.

The Court's Analysis and the Reinterpretation of Wilko
a.

The PresumptionFavoringArbitration

The McMahon Court was marked by a close split.' 2 7 Justice O'Connor
wrote the majority opinion and set the tenor of the decision by first declaring the Federal Arbitration Act's "policy favoring arbitration" and recanting the "judicial suspicion" toward arbitration. 2 8 Additionally, the
Court stated that the "duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights. 11 29 The Court explained that the Arbitration Act's mandate
favoring arbitration may be overridden by prohibiting a waiver of a judicial
forum that "'will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history, or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes.""" The Court placed the burden on the McMahons to
argue that their
claims were excepted from the Arbitration Act by congressional intent.13 1

124. Petitioners had moved to compel arbitration of the agreement pursuant to Section 3 of
the Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). The district court granted arbitration in part, rejecting
the adhesion argument and concluding that the subsection 10(b) claims were arbitrable under the
Byrd decision and the "strong policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements." McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). It concluded the RICO claims were nonarbitrable. Id. at 387. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court on the state law and RICO claims, but reversed on the Exchange Act claims. McMahon v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Wilko for support). The
court of appeals noted that Byrd and Scherk cast doubt on the issue but cited to "clear judicial
precedent in this Circuit" and thus held that Wilko must apply. Id. at 98.
125. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-29.
126. Id.
127. McMahon was a 5-4 decision. Id. at 221.
128. Id. at 226.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 227 (citing Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628, 63237 (1985)).
131. Id.
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The Arguments Against CongressionalIntent as Expressed in the
Statutory Language

The McMahons argued that subsection 29(a) prohibited the waiver of
Section 27 of the Exchange Act because that would void a waiver of "any
provision" of the Exchange Act.132 The Court disagreed and stated that
subsection 29(a) only prohibited a waiver of the Act's substantive obligations and therefore did not void the waiver of Section 27 of the Act - 1the
33
procedural provision which confers exclusive district court jurisdiction.
The Court reasoned that "[w]hat the antiwaiver provision of
[sub]section 29(a) forbids is enforcement of agreements to waive 'compliance' with the provisions of the statute." 134 The Court further noted that
"Section 27 does not impose any duty with which persons trading in securities must 'comply.' ",135 Therefore, "its waiver does not constitute a waiver
of 'compliance with any provision' of the Exchange Act under [sub]section
136
29(a)."
The Court did not believe that the Wilko decision compelled a different
result.' 3 7 The Court acknowledged that Section 14 and subsection 29(a)
contained the same wording, but stated that Wilko was expressly based on
the Court's belief that arbitration was inadequate 138 and "that a judicial
forum was needed to protect the substantive rights created by the Securities
Act."' 139 In reaching this position, the Court relied on its dicta in Scherk,
stating that "Scherk supports our understanding that Wilko must be read as

132. Id. at 228-29. Subsection 29(a) of the Exchange Act states that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or
of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."

15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988).
133. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.

134. Id.
135. Id. But Cf. Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 800 F.2d 1032, 1038 (1lth Cir. 1986) (holding
that Wilko applies to Exchange Act claims). However, Judge Tjoflat, in his concurring opinion,

stated:
Were I writing on a clean slate, I might well be inclined to reach a result contrary to
the Wilko Court. Section 14 of the 1933 Act renders void any provision binding a security
purchaser to "waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter".... A fair reading
of this statute would prevent a purchaser from waiving a seller's compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act.... By agreeing to arbitrate, the purchaser does not waive
the Act's protections, but merely agrees to enforce the Act's provisions in a forum other
than the courts.
Id. at 1039 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
136. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 228-29.
139. Id.
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barring waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitration is inadequate to
protect the substantive rights at issue."' 14
c.

The Underlying Purposes of the Exchange Act Are Not Frustrated

The MeMahons raised several arguments which attempted to prove that
the underlying purpose of the Exchange Act would be frustrated by arbitration and, therefore, Congress could not have intended such a result.' 1 The
McMahons reasoned that the main purpose of the Exchange Act, to protect
investors against broker overreaching, would not be furthered by submission of subsection 10(b) claims to arbitration. 42 They argued that predispute agreements were void under subsection 29(a) because they tended to
result from broker overreaching, 143 positing that Wilko barred enforcement
of predispute agreements for this reason as well as on the assumption that
predispute arbitration clauses were not voluntary.'"
The Court refused to accept the McMahons' interpretation of the Wilko
holding with respect to Section 14 and subsection 29(a), 4 ' and cited Mitsubishi for the proposition that by submitting to arbitration "'a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.' "'4" The McMahon
Court held that the voluntariness of the agreement was irrelevant under
subsection 29(a).'14 7 The Court explained that subsection 29(a) is concerned
with whether the agreement "weaken[s] their ability to recover under the
[Exchange] Act," and not whether the brokers "maneuvered customers"
into an agreement.' 48 Agreements which were challenged under concepts
of adhesion or involuntariness only provided grounds for revoking the contracts under contract law, not subsection 29(a). 4 9
The McMahons went on to argue that arbitration did in fact "weaken
their ability to recover under the Exchange Act."' 50 The Court stated that
this argument was the "heart" of the Court's decision in Wilko.' 5 ' The
140. Id. at 229 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
141. Id. at 230-31.
142. Id. at 230.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 229-30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473

U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)).
149. Id. at 230-31.
150. Id. at 231.
151. Id.
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Court, however, based on three assertions, disagreed with this argument.
First, the Court restated the underlying reasons behind the Wilko finding
that arbitration was disadvantageous.1 1 2 The McMahon Court concurred
with Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Wilko, arguing that the Wilko case did
not rest on any evidence "'in the record... [or] in the facts of which [it
could] take judicial notice' that 'the arbitral system... would not afford the
plaintiff the rights to which he was entitled.' "153 Second, the Court stated
that most of the reasons given in Wilko for rejecting arbitration had been
subsequently rejected by the Court as a basis for holding claims non-arbitrable.' 5 4 Citing Mitsubishi, the Court stated:
In Mitsubishi, for example, we recognized that arbitral tribunals are
readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and
supervision. Likewise, we have concluded that the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on
substantive rights. Finally, we have indicated that there is no reason
to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law;
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to1 ensure
that arbitrators comply with
55
statute.
the
of
requirements
the
Third, the McMahon Court stated that even if Wilko's assumption regarding arbitration was once valid, it was no longer valid because of the
Securities and Exchange Commission's [hereinafter "SEC"] oversight authority with respect to the rules governing self-regulatory organizations
156
[hereinafter "SRO"].
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
154. Id. at 231-32.
155. Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 233-34. The Court noted that when Wilko was decided, the SEC had only "limited authority over the rules governing self-regulatory organizations (SROs) ...and this authority
appears not to have included any authority at all over their arbitration rules." Id. The Court went
on to specifically address the power the SEC now has:
Since the 1975 amendments to § 19 of the Exchange Act, however, the Commission has
had expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the
SROs. No proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that the proposed
rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act; and the Commission has the
power, on its own initiative, to "abrogate, add to, and delete from" any SRO rule if it finds
such changes necessary or appropriate to further the objectives of the Act. In short, the
Commission has broad authority to oversee and to regulate the rules adopted by the SROs
relating to customer disputes, including the power to mandate the adoption of any rules it
deems necessary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights
(footnote omitted).
In the exercise of its regulatory authority, the SEC has specifically approved the arbitration procedures of the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and
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The Legislative Intent Behind the 1975 Amendments Does Not
ProhibitArbitration

Finally, the MeMahons argued that even if subsection 29(a) did not specifically void predispute arbitration agreements, Congress had subsequently
intended that subsection 29(a) do so. 157 Specifically, the McMahons' argument was that Congress had ample opportunity in its 1975 amendments to
correct the federal courts' application of Wilko to the Exchange Act, but it
had not. 158 Therefore, by virtue of its inaction, Congress approved of the
extension to subsection 10(b) cases.1 59 This "absence of action" argument
was based on a sentence from the Conference Report, which the McMahons
contended ratified Wilko's extension to the Exchange Act. The Court,
quoting the Conference Report, stated:
The Senate bill amended section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 with respect to arbitration proceedings between self-regulatory organizations and their participants, members, or persons dealing with members or participants. The House amendment contained
no comparable provision. The House receded to the Senate. It was
the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment did
not change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427 (1953), concerning the effect of arbitration proceedings provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing
with members
16
and participants of self-regulatory organizations.
The McMahons argued that the acknowledgement of Wilko in a revision of the Exchange Act meant that the conferees were aware of lower
court decisions extending Wilko to subsection 10(b) claims, and thus there
was an intention to approve of these decisions.' 61 The Court disagreed with
this reading and contended that Congress could not have intended this result without enacting into law any provision remotely addressing that

subject. 162

the [National Association of Securities Dealers].... We conclude that where, as in this
case, the prescribed procedures are subject to the Commission's § 19 authority, an arbitration agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections of the Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 234-38.
158. Id. at 234-35.
159. Id. at 237.
160. Id. at 236-37 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted
in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 321, 342).
161. Id. at 237.
162. Id. at 237-38, The Court further argued that the Report was ambiguous and would not
support such a reading. Ia
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Blackmun's Dissent

Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority's decision to uphold the
arbitration of RICO claims but disagreed with the Court's refusal to extend
Wilko to subsection 10(b) claims.1 6 3 He based his dissent primarily on
three arguments: (1) Congress had adopted Wilko's application to subsection 10(b) in its 1975 amendments to this act and related legislative history;"' (2) the majority erred in their construction of Wilko and construed
its holding too narrowly;16 and (3) many of the problems with the arbitral
process upon which the Wilko Court based its decision still exist.' 66 Each
of the three arguments are discussed below.
a. 1975 Amendments
Blackmun first noted that the 1975 amendments were regarded as "the
'most substantial and significant revision of this country's federal securities
laws since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934.' "167 Justice
Blackmun argued that although the Conference Report did not expressly
state Congress' approval of Wilko's extension to Exchange Act claims, he
the majority opinion stated were
did not agree with the "difficulties" 1that
68
created by a lack of direct reference.
Blackmun contended that in enacting amendments regarding exceptions
to subsection 29(a), Congress was enacting provisions "directly related' to
the general subject of Wilko and its extension to Exchange Act claims. "169
By this argument, Blackmun clearly contradicted the Court's assumption
that these provisions were not remotely addressing that subject.
b. Misinterpretationof Wilko
Justice Blackmun then went on to contend that Wilko was given an
"overly narrow" reading in order to fit into a "syllogism" advanced by the
SEC, namely that: "(1) Wilko is really a case concerning whether arbitration was adequate for the enforcement of the substantive provisions of the
securities law; (2) all of the Wilko Court's doubts as to arbitration's ade163. Id. at 242-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
164. Id. at 246-48.
165. Id. at 249-57.
166. Id. at 259-68.
167. Id. at 246 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1983), and
quoting Securities Act Amendments of 1975: See Hearings on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 1
(1975)).
168. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 247 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
169. Id.
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quacy are outdated; (3) thus Wilko is no longer good law."' 7 ° Blackmun
pointed out that the McMahon Court was ignoring the true ground upon
which Wilko stood; Wilko held that the text and legislative history of the
Securities Act - not problems with arbitration - established the Securities
Act as an exception to the Arbitration Act. 7 ' Blackmun cited Mitsubishi
as well as the Wilko opinion itself to support this position. Mitsubishi

stated:
'Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of
arbitration agreements covered by that Act, it is the congressional
intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must
rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to

arbitrate will be held unenforceable....

We must assume that if

Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given

statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative

,172
history .
Blackmun noted that there was a thorough discussion in Wilko of the
legislative history and purposes underlying the Act, primarily that of investor protection.17 3 This was in contrast to the lack of discussion of these
policies in the majority opinion in McMahon."7 4 The Wilko Court held that
the purpose could only be advanced by adjudication in a judicial forum. 7 5

170. Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 250-51.
172. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
627-28 (1985)).
173. Id. at 251-52.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 252. Blackmun explained that Wilko provided that a predispute arbitration agreement involving subsection 12(2) claims would constitute a" 'waiver' of a provision of the Act, Le.,
the right to the judicial forum embodied in [sub]section 22(a)." Id. Blackmun noted that Wilko
specifically referred to the policy of investor protection underlying the Act by saying:
While a buyer and seller of securities, under some circumstances, may deal at arm's
length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities have better
opportunities to investigate and appraise the prospective earnings and business plans affecting securities than buyers. It is therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securities covered by that Act on a different basis from other purchasers.
When the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives his right to
sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant in other business transactions.
The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue. He thus surrenders one of the
advantages the Act gives him and surrenders it at a time when he is less able to judge the
weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his adversary.
Id. at 252-53 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
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Blackmun also noted that the Securities Act was passed after the Arbitration Act. 176
Additionally, Blackmun took issue with the majority's interpretation of
Section 14.177 Again, Blackmun asserted that Wilko had been misread in its
interpretation of the statute.1 7 ' The McMahon majority suggested that subsection 29(a), which is the same as Section 14, can only be read to mean
that an investor cannot waive security-investment personnel's "compliance"
with a duty under the statute. 179 Blackmun contended that the Wilko
Court did not read the non-waiver provision so narrowly and suggested that
the provision could also be read to mean that "an investor could not waive
his compliance with the provision for dispute resolution in the courts."' 0
In the latter interpretation, it is irrelevant that Section 27 does not impose a
duty, therefore, the reason for not applying subsection 29(a) to Section 27
does not exist.""
Finally, Blackmun noted that the majority's discussion of the inadequacies of arbitration appeared "after the Court had concluded that the language, legislative history, and purposes of the Securities Act mandated an
'8 2
exception to the Arbitration Act for these securities claims."'
After providing his interpretation of Wilko, Blackmun then addressed
the core issue, i.e., whether the "language, legislative history, and purposes
of the Exchange Act call[ed] for an exception to the Arbitration Act for
[subsection] 10(b) claims."' 8 3 Blackmun concluded that Wilko should apply because of the similarities in wording of the waiver provisions and the
analogous purposes in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.' 8 4
c. Problems with Arbitration
Blackmun's final argument contended that even if Wilko was narrowly
read as having been based on the inadequacies of arbitration, the majority
decision was still erroneous because many of these problems continue to
exist.' 8 5 Blackmun was uncertain that the SEC's oversight of the SRO's
arbitration procedures would overcome these problems and be adequate to
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 251.
Id. at 253-54 n.9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254.

183. Id. at 256-57.

184. Id.
185. Id. at 257-68.
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protect investor rights under the federal securities acts.186 Even though
Blackmun noted that there had been some improvements in the arbitration
process since Wilko, such as the development of a uniform code, he argued
that the characteristics which make arbitration attractive create the very
problems that are at odds with the protection of the investor. 187 Blackmun
explained that the same problems exist post-Wilko as they did pre-Wilko:

The preparation of a record of procedures is still not required; arbitrators
are still not bound by procedures and are in fact discouraged by their associations from giving reasons for their decisions; and judicial review is still

limited. 188

Additionally, Blackmun questioned the SEC's turnaround18 9 in inter-

preting McMahon as supporting arbitration claims in light of the SEC's past
dissatisfaction with the use of predispute arbitration agreements1 90 and the

186. Id.
187. Id. at 258-59.
188. Id. at 259.
189. Id. at 261-64. Justice Blackmun stated:
The Court, however, fails to acknowledge that, until it filed an amicus brief in this case, the
Commission consistently took the position that § 10(b) claims, like those under § 12(2),
should not be sent to arbitration, that predispute arbitration agreements, where the investor was not advised of his right to a judicial forum, were misleading, and that the very
regulatory oversight upon which the Commission now relies could not alone make securities-industry arbitration adequate.
Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
190. Id. at 263 n.22. Justice Blackmun stated:
The Commission, in a release issued in 1979, explained its opposition to predispute
arbitration agreements:
It is the Commission's view that it is misleading to customers to require execution of
any customer agreement which does not provide adequate disclosure about the meaning
and effect of its terms, particularly any provision which might lead a customer to believe
that he or she has waived prospectively rights under the federal securities laws, rules thereunder, or certain rules of any self-regulatory organization. Customers should be made
aware prior to signing an agreement containing an arbitration clause that such a prior
agreement does not bar a cause of action arising under the federal securities laws. If a
broker-dealer customer's agreement contains an arbitration clause, it must be consistent
with current judicial decisions regarding the application of the federal securities laws to
predispute arbitration agreements.
The Commission is especially concerned that arbitration clauses continue to be part of
form agreements widely used by broker-dealers, despite the number of cases in which these
clauses have been held to be unenforceable in whole or in part. Requiring the signing of an
arbitration agreement without adequate disclosure as to its meaning and effect violates
standards of fair dealing with customers and constitutes conduct that is inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade. In addition, it may raise serious questions of compliance with the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Id. (citing Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements Which Provide for Arbitration of Future Disputes, 44 Fed. Reg. 40462, 40464 (1979) (footnotes omitted)).
Justice Blackmun concluded:
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rule it effected to prohibit them.19 1 He posited that the underlying reasons
for the SEC's long history in opposing arbitration should weigh more heavily than its recent turnaround.' 92 Finally, Blackmun found that the SEC's
oversight with the SRO's would not protect investors because the SEC's
authority was limited to the form of general review and supervision of the
SRO's and their rules. 193 Blackmun added that the Court's complacent acceptance was "alarming" in light of recent and numerous abuses and violations on Wall Street. 194 Blackmun argued these problems indicate that
industry self-regulation is not functioning, and therefore, the SRO's regulation of arbitration may suffer the same fate. 195

IV. EVENTS

FOLLOWING THE MCMAHON DECISION

Following the McMahon decision, significant questions were raised concerning Wilko's continued validity. Lower courts were left with stare decisis which the Supreme Court had all but effectively dismissed. As a result,
the opinions of these courts were inconsistent as to the continued application of Wilko to Securities Act claims. Some circuits noted that McMahon
As the quoted material suggests, the Commission was aware of the court cases concerning such arbitration agreements. In the release, the Commission discussed at length this

Court's Wilko decision and cases in which courts had extended it to § 10(b) claims....
The thrust of the release is that the Commission not only accepted the case law but also,
for its own reasons, thought that the arbitration agreements in the predispute context were
inappropriate and misleading.... The Commission acknowledges that in 1975 it even fied
an amicus brief in Ayres v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc, 538 F.2d 532 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976), in which it supported the extension of Wilko
to § 10(b) claims.
Id. at 263-64 n.22 (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 264 (citing Rule 15c2-2). Rule 15c2-2 states:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker or dealer
to enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports to bind the customer
to the arbitration of future disputes between them arising under the Federal securities laws,
or to have in effect such an agreement, pursuant to which it effects transactions with or for
a customer.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1986).
192. Blackmun explained that the Court was swayed by the 1975 amendments giving the
SEC power "to oversee the rules and procedures of the SROs, including those dealing with arbitration." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 262.
193. Id. at 265. The SEC "neither policies nor monitors the results of [SRO] arbitrations for
possible misapplications of securities laws or for indications of how investors fare in these proceedings." Id.
194. Id. at 265-66.
195. Id.
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had questioned Wilko but considered Wilko judicial precedent.1 96 Other
courts regarded the McMahon decision as having eroded the rationale of
Wilko. 197

After McMahon, and in anticipation of the increased use of arbitration,
the SEC rescinded Rule 15c2-2 198 and sent to the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration [hereinafter "SICA"] 199 a number of recommenda-

tions for changes in SRO arbitration.2 ' ° Additionally, the SEC considered
a two-part recommendation which would have: (1) proposed an amendment to the Exchange Act to prohibit a broker-dealer from conditioning

investor access to brokerage services on the signing of predispute arbitration
agreements; and (2) asked the SRO's to use their broad rule making authority to effect the same result.20 1 The SEC, however, voted unanimously to
196. See, e.g., Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1987); Pompano-Windy City Partners
v. Bear, Steams & Co., 698 F. Supp. 504, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (following Wilko as judicial
precedent).
197. See, e.g., Aronson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 675 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
see also Noble v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 823 F.2d 849, 850 (5th Cir. 1987); Ryan v.
Liss, Tenner & Goldberg See. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 480, 484 (D.N.J. 1988); Kavouras v. Visual
Products Sys., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Reed v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 698 F. Supp.
835 (D. Kan. 1988); DeKuyper v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1367 (D. Conn.
1987); Rosenblum v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. La. 1987); Staiman
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
198. In rescinding the rule, the Commission stated:
[Tihe Supreme Court held in Shearson/American Express v. MeMahon that predispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are enforceable. In addition, although the Court did not expressly overrule Wilko v. Swan which
held that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 were not enforceable, the Court's reasoning raised questions regarding
the continuing vitality of that decision. In light of these developments, the Commission
believes that Rule 15c2-2 is no longer appropriate or accurate and, accordingly, should be
rescinded.
Rescission of Rule Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Dealer Customer
Agreements. 52 FED. REG. 39,217 (1987).
199. Before the 1975 amendments, there was no uniform code on arbitration and the SROs
had different rules for the administration of arbitration disputes. Several SROs proposed to the
SEC that a securities industry task force be established to develop the code. SICA, which consists
of representatives from various SROs, the public, and the Securities Industry Association [hereinafter "SIA"], was thereafter established. SICA developed the Uniform Code of Arbitration and
developed a handbook on procedures. See Katsoris, SecuritiesArbitration After McMahon, 16
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 731 (1989) for a discussion of the SICA and the SIA.
200. See Katsoris, supra note 199, at 369 n.54 (noting the letter from the SEC to the SICA
discussing the completed proposals). For a discussion of these recommendations and others, see
Fitterman, McGuire, & Love, SEC Initiativesfor Changes in SRO Arbitration Rules, PLI CONFERENCE REPORT, 813 (Sept. 26, 1988).
201. 53 Fed. Reg. 25,567 (1988).
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oppose such legislation.2 "2 The SRO's then proposed new rules requiring
all predispute clauses to be highlighted, clarifying who will qualify as a public arbitrator, expanding the form and content of the arbitration reward to
provide more detailed information, and requiring that a record of the proceeding be kept.2 °3
In addition to the reaction of the courts to McMahon, certain members
of Congress were stunned by the SEC's sudden change in its position
against arbitration and vowed to investigate the matter.2 1 In its investigation, Congress considered new legislation such as the Securities Arbitration
Reform Act of 1988 [hereinafter "Reform Act"] which attempted to impose
certain rules and guidelines for the arbitration of securities disputes. 205 The
Reform Act addressed the concern that predispute arbitration agreements
were adhesion contracts.20 6 It also addressed
the procedural inadequacies
20 7
of the arbitral system to protect investors.
202. SEC Votes to Oppose Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 20 See. Reg. & L.J. Rep. 1053
(1988). SEC Chairman David Ruder explained that mandatory clauses are not prevalent in cash
accounts; it is estimated that 39% of an estimated 13 million cash accounts contained mandatory
arbitration agreements. Commissioner Ruder stated that he had confidence that the SROs could
handle any problems without the need for legislation, which would cause undesirable inflexibility.
Id.
203. See, ag., Self-Regulatory Organization; Proposed Rule Changes By American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Proposed Amendments to Exchange Procedures Which Govern the Administration of Security Industry Arbitration, 54 Fed. Reg. 3878 (1989). The New York Stock
Exchange and the National Association of Security Dealers have also proposed similar changes.
Self-Regulatory Organization; Proposed Rule Changes By New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Proposed amendments to Exchange Procedures Which Govern the Administration of Security Industry Arbitration, 54 Fed. Reg. 3883 (1989).
204. Comment, supra note 8, at 352 n.120 (quoting letter from John D. Dingell, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the Committee on Energy and Commerce to
John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 11, 1987)).
205. CoNG. REc. E2233-35 (daily ed. June 30, 1988); see also Securities Arbitration Reform
Act of 1988, H.R. 4960, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
206. Edward Markey of Massachusetts stated that the predispute agreements were in fact
contracts of adhesion, and that "[r]estoring to investors the right to choose judicial resolution of
future disputes is a basic investor protection that will go some distance toward restoring individual investor confidence so severely damaged after the October crash." CONG. Ruc. E2245 (daily
ed. June 30, 1988) (introduction of the Securities Arbitration Reform Act of 1988, H.R. 4960 by
Rep. Edward Markey).
207. The reasoning behind the Reform Act was expressed by Rick Boucher:
The arbitration system the securities industry forces onto these customers is run by the
exchanges themselves. There are no rules of evidence. The arbitrators are paid by the
exchanges. The locations and times of the hearings are often set at the convenience of the
arbitrators and brokers with little regard for the investor seeking redress. When the investor does win awards it is seldom for the full amount of loss, and in some cases do not even
cover the cost of travel and attorneys fees. There are no written decisions and few records
are kept. Nothing is made public and appeals to the courts are extremely unlikely except
in the most blatent [sic] cases of misconduct, and not necessarily even in those cases.
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In 1989, however, the Supreme Court finally resolved the Wilko dilemma in Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express.
V. THE RODRIGUEZ DECISION
A.

The Facts
20 8

The petitioners in Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/AmeicanExpress
invested approximately $400,000 in securities using Shearson/American
Express as their broker. The value of the petitioners' investment declined
and suit was brought pursuant to subsection 12(2) of the Securities Act and
several other federal securities sections and state claims. 2°9 The petitioners
alleged that their losses occurred as a result of unauthorized and fraudulent
transactions by the broker-agent in charge. The parties had entererd into a
predispute arbitration agreement.
The district court ordered all claims to be submitted to arbitration except those raised under subsection 12(2) of the Securities Act,2 10 citing
Wilko as the basis of denying arbitration.2 11 Upon review of the lower
court's holding, the court of appeals concluded that
subsequent Supreme
21 2
Court decisions reduced Wilko to "obsolescence.1
B.

The Holding

As Blackmun had prophesied in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon,2 13 the Rodriguez Court overruled Wilko, utilizing many of the
arguments that had been enumerated previously in McMahon. These arguments which focused primarily on the Court's refusal to extend Wilko to
subsection 10(b), 2 14 are set forth below.
1. The Reason for Applying Section 14 to Procedural Provisions No
Longer Exists
The Rodriguez Court reasoned that the Wilko Court could have just as
easily applied Section 14 of the Securities Act to the substantive provisions
"without including the remedy provisions," but chose not to for two reaCONG. REc. E2233-35, supra note 205 (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher).
208. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
209. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1919.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.

213. 482 U.S. 220, 243 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
214. Id. at 232-33.
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sons. 215 First, the Court stated that Wilko found that "arbitration lacked
the certainty of suit. ' 2 16 Second, " 'the right to select the judicial forum' "
was based on putting buyers and sellers on more equal footing.2 17 The
Court, thereafter, proceeded to recant these reasons based on the following
three arguments:
a.

Wilko Was Outmoded in Its View on Arbitration

The Court struck down the first reason stating it rested more on "the
old judicial hostility to arbitration" instead of realities. 2 15 The Court cited
Mitsubishi for the proposition that in submitting disputes to the arbitration
process, the buyer does not "forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
2 19
statute ... [but] only submits to their resolution in [a different] forum.
The Court stated further that Wilko had "fallen far out of step with our
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of
resolving disputes. ' 22 ° Additionally, the Court cited McMahon, noting the
recent expansion of SEC powers as being another reason for supporting
arbitration.2 2 1
b.

The ProceduralProvisions Were Not Essential Because They Could Be
Waived: A Reinterpretation of Section 14

The Rodriguez Court posited that:
[o]nce the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings is set to one side, it becomes clear that the right to select
the judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such essential features of the Securities Act that section 14 is properly construed to bar any waiver of these provisions.22 2
The Court also stated "[n]or are they so critical that they cannot be
waived under the rationale that the Securities Act2 23was intended to place
buyers of securities on equal footing with sellers.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Rodriguez, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1919.
Id.
Id.at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1919-20.
Id. at 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628

(1985).
220. Id.
221. Id. at

-,

109 St. Ct. at 1921.

222. Id. at -, 109 St. Ct. at 1920.
223. Id. The Court stated that in order to advance the objective of putting buyers on equal
footing with sellers, Wilko had identified two different kinds of provisions: substantive and procedural. Id. at _ 109, St. Ct. 1920-21. The Court enumerated the specific procedural provisions
highlighted in Wilko:

1989]

IMPACT ON INVESTOR PROTECTION

In this argument, the Court attempted to reinterpret Section 14. It was
the opinion of the Court that reinterpretation was necessary because the
presumption against arbitration was removed and, therefore, the protective
guarantees of Section 14 were no longer essential.2 24 Additionally, proof of
their lack of necessity was shown as the Securities Act itself provided for
waiver of these guarantees by giving plaintiffs the option to file in state
court, thus waiving the judicial advantage of federal court jurisdiction.22
c. Subsection 29(a) of the Exchange Act and Section 14 of the Securities
Act Should Be Read in the Same Way
The Court explained that because Section 14 and subsection 29(a) have
virtually the same wording, 226 and because the McMahon Court refused to
read subsection 29(a) as prohibiting arbitration,2 27 Section 14 should thus
be read the same way.2 28 The Court, however, noted the difference between
the jurisdictional provisions of the two acts. 229 The Court reasoned that the
concurrent jurisdiction statute supported the concept of providing a selection of forum.2 30 It concluded that the opportunity to select arbitration was
a type of forum shopping, advancing this objective.2 3 1
2.

The Burden of Exception from the Arbitration Act Was Not Carried

The Rodriguez Court cited McMahon's emphasis on the application of
the Arbitration Act and the strong federal policy in favor of the arbitration
of securities disputes.23 2 The Court cited to the Arbitration Act's preference for arbitration agreements claiming they are " 'valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.' "233 The Court added that the Arbitration Act
[Tihe statute's broad venue provisions in the federal courts; the existence of nationwide
service of process in the federal courts; the extinction of the amount-in-controversy requirement that had applied to fraud suits when they were brought in federal courts under
diversity jurisdiction rather than as a federal cause of action; and the grant of concurrent
jurisdiction in the state and federal courts without possibility of removal.
Id. at 1920.
224. Id. The procedural guarantees the Court referred to are those enumerated in Wilko. See
supra note 223 and accompanying text.
225. Id. at 1920-21.
226. Id. at 1921.
227. Id.
228. Id.

229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.

233. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)).
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would not be applied, however, if the "party opposing arbitration carries
the burden of showing that Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies, inherently conflicts with the underlying purposes of that other
statute. 2 34 The Court quoted Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Wilko stating
that "'[t]here is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which
we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system ... would
not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled.' ",235
Additionally, Section 2 of the Act disallows arbitration where the party
opposing the arbitration presents "well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic
power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.' ",236
The Court explained that this exception to the Act "is in harmony with the
Securities Act's concern to protect buyers of securities by removing 'the
2 7
disadvantages under which buyers labor' in their dealings with sellers.
The Rodriguez Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden on either ground.23 8
3.

Wilko and McMahon Created a Disharmony Between the Two Acts

Finally, the Court reasoned that it would be "undesirable" for Wilko
and McMahon to co-exist.23 9 In general, their inconsistencies would run
counter to the similar regulatory scheme of the two federal securities
acts.2 4' Additionally, litigants could manipulate their allegations in order
to fit under either one of the acts.24 The Court concluded this would undermine the policy of harmonious construction.2 42

VI.

THE RODRIGUEZ ANALYSIS AND RESULTING PROBLEMS

A.

The Acceptance of McMahon's Reinterpretationof Wilko

For the most part, the congressional intent behind the Securities Act
was bypassed in the Rodriguez decision in favor of the Arbitration Act.
The Court's major focus in Rodriguez was the acceptance of McMahon's
234. Id. (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987)).
235. Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
236. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985)).

237. Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at

240. Id.
241. Id.

242. Id.

-,

109 S. Ct. at 1922.
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interpretation of Wilko, that arbitration was insufficient to address securities law claims. Even though Rodriguez recognized that the Wilko Court
based its holding on "the language, purposes, and legislative history of the
Securities Act, and concluded that the agreement to arbitrate was void," 24 3
this acknowledgement was only dicta. Therefore, in order to overrule the
Wilko holding, the Rodriguez Court had to reinterpret the basis for the
Wilko holding.
If the Wilko decision had in fact been based on Congress' intent to exclude the arbitration process from subsection 12(2) claims, as interpreted
from the "text, purposes, and legislative history of the Securities Act," then
the Rodriguez Court could not have overruled it. Congress had done nothing in the thirty-five years following the Wilko case to express a different
intent. If the Rodriguez Court had recognized and accepted Congressional
intent as the basis for the Wilko decision, it would have been irrelevant to
discuss whether or not the arbitration process had improved. Congressional intent, not the status of the arbitral process, would determine the
issue. Therefore, even if improvements were made and certain procedural
changes had occurred, it would have been irrelevant.
B.

Problems with Arbitration Go Unaddressed

Even if the overruling of Wilko could be justified on the grounds that
arbitration is no longer inadequate, it is stunning to see the Court's lack of
explanation for its change in position. First, the Court stated that the suspicion regarding the merits of arbitration that existed in the days of Wilko no
longer exist. As proof, it pointed to its strong endorsement of the arbitration process inpast decisions. 2" This argument posits that because there is
currently strong judicial support for arbitration, the process therefore has
become adequate. Unfortunately, it is still possible to place the judicial
stamp of approval on something even when it is inherently wrong. The
Court did this in Rodriguez, and thus failed to address the inadequacies that
were enumerated in Wilko and reemphasized by Justice Blackmun in the
McMahon dissent.24 5

243. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1919
(1989).
244. Id. at , 109 S. Ct. at 1920 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
245. See supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Rodriguez Court cited Mitsubishi for the proposition that
substantive rights are not waived in arbitration.2 46 This argument fails because Mitsubishi is not a securities law case and, in fact, the case actually
supports Wilko. 24 7
Third, the Court stated that arbitration had been upheld in other federal
statutory cases. 248 This argument stands for the proposition that since arbitration has been upheld in other federal statutory cases then it should be
extended to the Securities Act. At the core of this argument is the denial of
the importance of the unique congressional intent as to each federal statute
and more specifically, the unique intent underlying the Securities Act. In
claiming that arbitration was upheld in other statutory cases, the Court
assumes that the securities laws are like other federal statutory laws. If this
is so, the Court does not recognize the distinct regulatory scheme and purpose of the different federal laws and does not explain why their similarities
would support their being treated in the same manner.
Finally, the Rodriguez Court utilized the reasoning of the McMahon
opinion regarding the benefits of arbitration, as well as the importance of
SEC oversight for improving the system.24 9 The Court, however, failed to
address the inadequacies in the arbitration process that have existed since
Wilko, as pointed out by Justice Blackmun's dissent in McMahon, and the
impact that these inadequacies might have on investor protection. If the
core issue is not congressional intent but whether the status of arbitration

246. Rodriguez, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1920. But see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953). The Wilko court stated: "We said the right to select the 'forum' even after the creation of
a liability is a 'substantial' right and that the agreement, restricting that choice, would thwart the
express purpose of the statute." Id.
247. The Court stated in Mitsubishi:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act,
it is the congressionalintention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely
to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held
unenforceable.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (emphasis
added). See also Comment, supra note 8, at 371 n.249 for the proposition that, unlike some
courts' interpretations of the Mitsubishidecision, the Mitsubishi Court did not require the policies
behind the Arbitration Act and those of other federal securities laws to be weighed equally; see,
eg., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 297 (1st Cir. 1986)
(Arbitration Act should receive equal deference). Instead, the Mitsubishi Court explained that
courts must look at the congressional intent in the statute at issue to determine if Congress permitted waiver of a judicial forum. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
248. Rodriguez, - U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 1920; see cases cited supra note 244. The McMahon case is the only securities case cited, however, in which there is no analysis of the similarities
or dissimilarities between the two acts to support the argument.
249. Rodriguez, -

U.S. at

-,

109 S. Ct. at 1921.
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has improved sufficiently to protect investors under the securities acts, then
this is the basic question which must be answered. This question, however,
is never truly addressed by the Court. Instead, great reliance and hope are
placed on the SEC to address any inadequacies. This assumes that the
power of the SEC is broader than it is, and additionally, does not address
the impact that limitations on this power may have on investor protection.2 50 Additionally, even if SEC powers are eventually broadened, investors who have claims prior to the expansion will be affected.
C.

The Use of the FederalPolicy Toward FavoringArbitration
as a Basis for Statutory Interpretation

The second part of the Court's analysis, the interpretation of Section 14
of the Securities Act as supporting arbitration, is also puzzling. First, it
assumes that the status of arbitration as it now exists bears upon the statutory construction of Section 14. Again, this assumption supports the
Court's adoption of the McMahon interpretation of Wilko. Only under the
McMahon interpretation could it be said that Section 14 was originally misconstrued and that Section 14 applied to the remedial provisions because of
the inadequacies of the arbitration process at the time of Wilko.25 ' If
Wilko's holding, as originally interpreted, had been adopted by Rodriguez,
Section 14 and the status of arbitration could not have been interconnected.
Second, to bolster its argument that "remedial protections are non-essential,"25 2 and, therefore, can be waived, the Court reasoned that these
protections are not essential because the plaintiff may waive them by filing
in state court. This is at best a form of bootstrap reasoning. This argument
is problematic in four ways. First, it assumes that because these provisions
are waivable by the plaintiff, they are "not essential" to the policy underlying the Securities Act. However, this argument ignores the fact that the
waiver provision under the Act refers to the waiver of one judicial forum in
favor of another. In predispute arbitration agreements, the investor waives
a judicial forum in favor of a non-judicial forum. The question of "essentialness" is not concerned with the availability of different judicial forums,
but rather whether it is "essential" that a judicial forum be preserved to
effectuate the purpose of the Securities Act. The Court fails to address this
question.

250. See supra note 187 and accompanying text on the inadequacies of SEC oversight.
251. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228-29 (1987).
252. Rodriguez,

-

U.S.

-,

109 S. Ct. at 1920.
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Second, the term "essential" finds no correlative wording in Section 14
or subsection 22(a).1 3 Also, there is no distinction between essential and
non-essential provisions in Wilko. Instead, Wilko applied Section 14 to the
procedural provisions on the basis of both the statutory language in Section
14 and the underlying purpose of the Act without resorting to artificial terminology that has no bearing on the statutory language.25 4
Third, the Rodriguez Court stated that the prohibition in Section 14
against waiver of "compliance with any provision" cannot be meant to apply to the procedural provisions. This is in direct opposition to the original
reading of Wilko and ignores the reasoning behind the interpretation which
includes these provisions, that is, the underlying policy of investor protection. The Court's argument would be relevant only if the policy had
changed.
Fourth, the Court's argument that the effect of filing in state court is
analogous to arbitrating is problematic as well in that both cause waiver of
federal procedural advantages.2 5 5 The Court stated that "the grant of concurrent jurisdiction constitutes explicit authorization for complainants to
waive those protections. ' 256 In the Court's language, and indeed in the
construction of subsection 22(a), it is the choice of "the complainant" to
waive the protections and if waiver does occur, it occurs after the cause of
action arises.
By contrast, in predispute agreements, waiver is made prior to any action arising at a time when, according to Wilko, the investor "is less able to
judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon his adversary." ' 7 Additionally, it can be argued that waiver is not necessarily voluntary by virtue of the unequal bargaining power between the investor and
industry personnel.2 58 It was just this problem - unequal bargaining
power - that Wilko noted as the purpose that the Securities Act was
designed to address.25 9 However, even if predispute agreements were made

253.
254.
255.
256.

See statutes cited supra notes 19 and 37.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
Rodriguez, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
Id.

257. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
258. Id.; see also supra note 205 and accompanying text describing Congress' concern with
mandatory agreements. States have also become concerned with this issue. For example, Massachusetts passed regulations barring broker-dealers from including mandatory arbitration clauses

in their customer agreements. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass.
1988). The law was struck down before it became effective. Id. The Securities Industry Association filed suit and successfully challenged the regulation on the constitutionality of the prospective
security arbitration regulations. Id.
259. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
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voluntary in all situations, this would be irrelevant to the original reading of
Wilko, as it is congressional intent, not the status or fairness of the arbitral
process, that is relevant. In addition, the waiver of the right to a judicial
forum before the cause of action arises, even if voluntary, is antithetical to
the purpose of the Act - the protection of investors. Ensuring the voluntariness of these agreements only addresses one part of the policy of investor
protection - equality in negotiating or bargaining power. It does not, however, address another concern regarding the lack of sophistication that investors have in general about securities and the consequences which flow
from their decisions.
Finally, the Rodriguez Court stated that these procedural provisions can
be waived because the federal statutes have these same provisions, and they
have not been interpreted to prohibit enforcement of predispute agreements
to arbitrate."z6 This kind of logic again attempts to treat all federal statutes
the same.26 '
D.

The Problem with Sections 14 and 29 Being Given the Same
Interpretation

The Rodriguez Court's next argument was that Section 14 should be
given the same interpretation as Section 29 since the wording of these statutes is essentially the same.2 62 This argument rests on two presumptions:
(1) The McMahon Court was correct in finding that the Wilko Court erred
in its reading of Section 14 (in applying it to remedy provisions); and (2) the
difference between the jurisdictional sections in the two acts is not sufficient
to militate against Section 14 being read to mean the same as subsection
29(a).
The Court argued that the only conceivable difference between the two
acts, that of the concurrent jurisdiction, actually served "to advance the
objective of allowing buyers of securities a broader right to select the forum
for resolving disputes.... ,263 The Court's argument again presupposes
that the selection of the arbitral forum is at the option of the buyer, and
ignores the importance of the time when the option occurs - before the
cause of action commences. 264 Additionally, the Court revealed that the
selection of a forum was a "right." The Court itself has acknowledged the

260. Rodriguez, -

U.S. at

-,

109 S. Ct. at 1920.

261. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
262. Rodriguez, -

U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.

263. Id.
264. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
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importance of this right.2 65 A right, however, can be maintained only if it is
freely exercisable.
E.

An UnfairBurden

In support of the Court's argument that the investors did not carry their
burden of showing congressional intent to remove their claim from the Arbitration Act, the Rodriguez Court cited Justice Frankfurter's dissent in
Wilko. 26 6 This signifies that the Court believed that the plaintiff only satisfies the burden if he shows that the arbitral system was deficient in protecting his rights. This further indicates that the Court held that the status of
the arbitration process dictates congressional intent, instead of the other
way around.
Further, using the language in Wilko, the Court reasoned that Section 2
of the Arbitration Act, which gives relief against arbitration agreements
that are a result of "fraud or overreaching economic power, ' , 267 serves to
protect buyers of securities by removing "the disadvantages under which
buyers labor. '268 The Rodriguez Court argued that the fraud and overreaching defenses advance the concept of investor protection in the Act.
The Wilko language, however, is incorrectly applied. The language was
used in Wilko to prove that congressional intent denied an arbitral forum
altogether. It was not used as a means of providing an exception from arbitration in certain cases. If the Court refuses to remove Securities Act
claims from the Arbitration Act, then the only recourse that the investor
has is the grounds of revocation of the contract, fraud or overreaching de-

265. The Supreme Court has recognized that the choice of forum can have a dramatic effect
on the scope of the rights to be interpreted and enforced. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) ("the choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right
to be vindicated") (citing United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 359-60
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
The Bernhardt Court stated that:
[alrbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action
created by the State. The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part
of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from a court of law to an
arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.
Id.
266. Rodriguez, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
267. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627

(1985)).
268. Id. (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435) (noting that there was nothing in the record of Rodriguez to indicate that the agreement to arbitrate would not offer the plaintiff the rights to which he
was entitled).
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fenses. These defenses, however, are generally not successful. 2 6 9 This occurs at a time when even the SEC has expressed some concern about
mandatory arbitration agreements and buyer protection. 270 The policy of
buyer protection is, therefore, arguably not advanced by Section 2 of the
Arbitration Act.
In 1988, Commissioner David Ruder of the SEC testified before Congress that there were serious concerns with the use of predispute arbitration
agreements.27 1 He noted that there was a growing trend toward making
these agreements a condition of doing business with a securities firm.2 72
Ruder also stated that this was particularly disturbing in connection with
cash accounts where "choice" should be maintained.2 73 Additionally,
Ruder noted that the use of such agreements in margin accounts and option
accounts needed further examination because issues concerning margin and
option accounts such as fiduciary responsibility and customer suitability are
particularly complicated, and do not lend themselves to an easy solution.27 4
He further stated that with respect to all accounts, it is apparent that many
customers are not provided with clear and informative disclosure of either
the existence or meaning of predispute arbitration clauses.2 75 Finally,
Ruder noted that the content of these clauses must be regulated in order to
prevent brokers "from using their economic power to limit investors'
rights."

276

VII.

SUMMARY

Following the Rodriguez decision, the SEC approved a number of proposed recommendations made by SROs that were intended to improve industry arbitration programs. Among other things, these recommendations
provide for: the development and dissemination of a standardized award
summary; the preservation of a written record of proceedings; a more com269. For a discussion regarding the lack of success of these defenses, see Roth, Developments
in SecuritiesIndustryArbitration, PLI CONFERENCE REPORT 789, 807-08 (Oct. 17, 1988). "Customers frequently argue that compelled arbitration is unenforceable as unconscionable, either on
the theory that they were fraudulently induced to accept the arbitration clause or that the arbitration provision is an unenforceable contract of adhesion. Neither argument generally succeeds."
Id.
270. See Statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Subcommittee on Telecommunication and Finance of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce. PLI CONFERENCE REPORT 837 (July 11, 1988).

271. Id. at 849.
272. Id. at 848.

273. Id. at 849.
274. Id. at 853.
275. Id. at 852.
276. Id.
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plete disclosure of the rights customers waive under predispute arbitration
claims; additional procedures to resolve discovery disputes; and a revision
of the criteria for defining public and industry arbitrations. 2" In reviewing
these revisions, as well as the current status of the arbitration process, the
question remains the same - is the purpose of investor protection under
the securities laws advanced?
If one is to accept the premise that Rodriguez was decided incorrectly
and it was Congress' original intent that the judiciary be the only forum
that can adequately protect buyers, then these additional revisions as well
as any other attempts to improve the arbitral system, are irrelevant. If,
however, Rodriguez was decided correctly, and the argument is accepted
that an arbitral forum can be considered judicially equivalent in protecting
investors, then arbitration procedures must be scrutinized thoroughly to see
whether the promise of protection is delivered.
Severe problems in the arbitral process remain, however. Certainly the
arbitral process is not the equivalent of the judicial process in form and does
not pretend to be. Among other things, the full range of discovery procedures are not available, the review process is limited, the Federal Rules of
Evidence are not applicable, and punitive damages generally are not
awarded.
It is also questionable whether the arbitral process in substance can advance investor protection to the same extent as the judicial process. Despite
recent revisions to the arbitration process to increase procedural protection,
there are still major questions of fairness. It is still not mandatory that
arbitral opinions be written or required that the reason for the decision be
disclosed. The opportunity for review is thus limited. Additionally, a mistake of law is not currently grounds for vacating an arbitration award. This
is especially alarming when there is no requirement that arbitrators be instructed or educated in the law. As a result, arbitrators may misconstrue
the legal meaning of such basic and crucial statutory terms as "reasonable
care,.... material facts" or "burden of proof." The end result may be a decision based on the erroneous application of the law with little or no chance
of review.
Besides problems with arbitral procedures, the arbitration process may
be becoming more coercive than voluntary. It is commonly known that
many brokerage firms now are making it clear to clients that services will
not be provided unless the client agrees to predispute arbitration clauses.
For example, some large firms not only require customers to agree to com-

277. SEC Approves ArbitrationSummaries, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 683 (1989).
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pulsory arbitration but they liquidate the accounts of those who refuse.
Most of the accounts affected are either option or margin accounts; however 39%-60% are cash accounts. 27 This affects a good many investors.
With all of this in mind, an argument can be made that investors are not
protected to the extent that they are in the judicial process, particularly
when they are forced into predispute agreements as a result of their lack of
equal bargaining power and are faced with limited procedures to address
and review their claims. Proponents of arbitration argue that more procedures can be effectuated to right current inequities, but even so, the basic
features of arbitration - efficiency and lack of formality - necessarily
limit attempts to cloak the process with the protections that a judicial forum can provide. Additionally, if more laws and regulations are passed, the
arbitral process will lose the unique advantages it provides. In light of this,
the bottomline question becomes whether the inherent differences in the
arbitral process defeat the policy of investor protection to such an extent
that the purpose of the securities laws are not upheld. One can argue that
the slightest erosion of investor protection is enough to result in an answer
in the affirmative. If so, then the original interpretation of Wilko is correct
in concluding that Congress intended that only a judicial forum can fully
protect investors.

278. Barrons, June 5, 1989, at 13, col. 2.

